

# Youth and Drug Trafficking in the City of Rio de Janeiro



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First of all, I would like to express my thanks for inviting me here. I would also like to say that I have one great concern, which has been somewhat quietened after hearing the judge, who spoke before me, talk about the multidisciplinary perspective. I feel the need to clarify how I can contribute to this discussion when faced with this audience that is mainly made up of police workers, judges and attorneys. As an anthropologist I can, for example, help police who want to have a proactive rather than a reactive approach to crime. In other words, I can demonstrate how it is possible to work from the perspective of crime prevention, even in the case of the most serious crimes like murder. To this end, anthropologists and sociologists can contribute by studying social processes - the creation of social contexts that favour crime. We also study crime-causing subjective formation, or the way in which social practices are imposed on people (mainly on young people), to demonstrate where the centres of these social contexts that we are concerned with are, and the participants' level of subjectivity, as well as discussing what should be planned for fighting against these social and subjective formation processes that are leading a growing number of people into crime.

This is the question: why did so many young people in Brazil start to get increasingly involved in crime, especially more violent crime, from the end of the 1970s? Where did the nation fail in its role as a society that formally and informally brings up children? For example, why does it seem that there is an increased separation between what is morally and legally acceptable? I am not going to talk about the issue of drug usage, but I would say that one of the problems comes from the illegal nature of the use of certain substances, whereas there are others that are legal but cause a very similar amount of damage. Anthropologists who study the issue, and psychologists who attend to the issue both have difficulty understanding it, but this difficulty is also experienced by the judge who decides the sentence, probably based on police records, which dictate if a young person is processed as a trafficker or a user. In the end, this confusion is just the start of all our problems, as it creates differences of opinion about how much is morally acceptable and how much danger and damage is caused to citizens. When confronting this issue, it is obviously necessary to bear in mind that Brazil is a signatory to an international convention that stipulates that some drugs are prohibited and others are not. I was very pleased after listening to the judge, because I think that a lot of advances have been made related to drug users. Serious problems continue, however, when it comes to drug trafficking.

I am going to concentrate on the city of Rio de Janeiro where, since 1980, I have carried out many ethnographical surveys, as well as two victimisation surveys. The first one was carried out at the end of 2005 and 2006 for the whole city of Rio de Janeiro, and the

other in 2007 was only carried out in the city's favelas (shanty towns). The first victimisation survey included 20% of participants from favelas, which is around the percentage of Rio de Janeiro's population that lives in these areas. The same method was used for the two surveys: a long questionnaire that was given to a random sample in three stages to guarantee that the survey was representative. 3435 people were interviewed in the first survey, and 660 in the second. This means that each person interviewed represented 1,500 others, creating the possibility of making many cross-references and correlations between variables related to socio-economic conditions of the city's population and experiences of victimisation, crime perception, fear and insecurity, neighbourhood relations, image of and experiences with the Military and Civil Police and the Municipal Guards. Furthermore, today, it is possible to draw up many tables, historical series and graphs from data on violent deaths from DATASUS, the Ministry of Health.

I am going to speak briefly about economic and cultural globalisation, which is necessary to keep in mind, but I would say that Brazil's problem is that these global processes become a lot more serious, a lot more problematical when a country's institutions show failures or weaknesses, as is the case of Brazil. Organised crime, which has existed for centuries, gained a new momentum with the trafficking of drugs and guns and started to threaten organisation and government, as well as one of the basic principles for the existence of a state: the legitimate monopoly on violence. To a certain extent, this has happened all over the world, but the threat to the ability to govern has always been greater where a

country's institutions are weak and inconsistent. This favours institutional corruption, disrespect for the law, inefficiency and discrimination in the justice system and ineffective policies for prevention and treatment. The gap between the reality and the law, which exists everywhere where drugs are used, has been further widened to include, for example, corruption, robbery and even murder committed by law enforcement agents and by young people who get involved in trafficking.

There is no doubt that there has been a sharp increase in violent crime in Brazil, especially of murders. They tripled during the 80s in several cities, like Rio de Janeiro, and the figures increased by several times during the 90s in other cities. I am not going to list them all, because creating a list of the most violent cities in the country is not relevant to this discussion - I merely want to point out that Rio de Janeiro is not the issue, but rather the way in which Brazilian institutions reacted to the new problem of drug related organised crime.

The increase in violence, measured by the numbers of deaths caused by aggression, has led to uncertainty and ever-increasing costs for security and the health system. This even affected how other public policies were made, as greater public security costs meant that there was not as much money available for other important policies related to the fight against poverty, such as education and health. Further burdens are put on the system by the need to provide hospital treatment for victims of violence, the death of economically active people and related problems of stress, etc. The dead are mainly young men.

The paradoxes of the democratisation that happened in Brazil from the end of the 70s should be considered, as this was the same time that the number of murders in the country started to increase. The process of re-democratisation was started in 1978, at the same time that the Colombians invented new ways of producing cocaine. This caused a drop in the price of this psychotropic substance as it spread throughout the world, taking with it a type of illegal business which involved the use of guns to resolve any conflicts. This is why drugs went hand-in-hand with a significant increase in violent crime, especially murder committed by young men. The paradox lies in the fact that the Brazilian nation, which was constructed on ideals of cordiality, reconciliation and racial, ethnic and religious tolerance, is now witnessing the emergence of personal revenge mechanisms and uncontrollable aggressive impulses. For the Brazilians and for the rest of the world, Brazil used to be a country where *joie de vivre*, cordiality and racial and religious tolerance were the norm.

During the process of re-democratization at the end of the military government, neither pardon nor pacification between opposing camps was publicly discussed. There was a scheme that took place behind the scenes of power that finally resulted in a series of agreements. The very idea of pardon was not discussed and a lot of unpardoned criminals were left unpunished, encouraging them to stay in the world of crime.

Last, but not least, the process of re-democratisation has still not been completed in the sense that Military Police structures were not changed. The internal and external controls on the excess use of police force were not changed either, and this force is still used at a level that places Brazil as one

of the countries in the world that kills the most civilians. Part of this is related to access to and control of weapons and ammunition belonging to the Armed Forces, which are continually stolen and found in the hands of traffickers.

This definitely does not ease the transformation of the Military Police into a proactive force, into a force that has more contact with the community, a force that views the use of intelligence and investigation as being much more important than violent repression. I know that this is a controversial subject, but I would like to express my opinion on the matter after having studied it for many years. In more than 600 or 700 interviews held with people who live in poor neighbourhoods or favelas, I listened to a lot of them say that the problem started when the Civil Guard's policing duties in Rio de Janeiro were taken on by the Military Police at the end of the 60s during the military regime. The issue of access to weapons belonging to the Armed Forces is a very serious problem that was never resolved. Why? As I understand, there has been very little investigation into this. No effort has been made to understand how this flow of weapons has come about - imported weapons, smuggled weapons and weapons given to traffickers in the favelas by corrupt police and members of the Armed Forces. This has been happening for many years since the end of the 70s. Since 1980, when I began surveying in Rio de Janeiro, the residents have been telling me that the police bring the weapons in. This was confirmed in all the favelas where surveys were carried out by the team that I coordinate.

The second controversial point to be discussed is the idea that repressing crime

also stimulates crime. Why? Because there still has not been an investigation into illegal activities carried out by law enforcement officers, and also because repressing this lucrative, illegal economic activity and the use of illegal drugs creates the temptation of corruption in the police officer who decides on the future of the person involved. Due to law enforcement agents being easily corruptible, given the amount of money involved in drug trafficking, and due to the violence linked to illegal commerce, a whole series of participants become interested in maintaining their illegality because of the advantages that it brings to them.

There is also the fact that, for many years, repression was exclusively focused on poor young black men, who are not the people who get rich from illegal economic activity. I recently carried out a survey of ex-traffickers who had been in prison, and none of them had any possessions after their years of imprisonment. There are certainly people who get rich, but most of the small traffickers who end up in prison do not. In other words, the seductive power of easy money and power gained through weapons and trafficking is no more than a trap for young impoverished men. As part of prevention, this sociological knowledge has to be urgently conveyed to vulnerable young people. The illusion of "easy money" attracts poor young people to gangs, but it enriches other untouchable wealthy people: people who receive stolen goods, wholesale traffickers, arms smugglers, corrupt police, private security and militias.

In fact, Brazil has stopped investigating those people who earn the most out of this tragedy that has affected all of us as a community over recent decades: wholesale

traffickers, arms smugglers, corrupt police and private security guards who take no specialist courses and are not controlled by the Federal Police. Poor young black men in jail for trafficking make up a huge prison population, meaning that the country's judicial system is unfair. This increases revolts and makes the prisoners choose criminal behaviour. The traffickers who are put in prison know that their suppliers, or rather their main suppliers who provided them with weapons or drugs, are not investigated. "Formiguinha" (small scale trafficking) also exists and is carried out by "packhorses" who carry merchandise in their luggage in small quantities. These are the only people who are imprisoned. The main suppliers are not in prison, which separates them even further from the law and creates distrust of the justice system. These are reasons for poor young people to rebel more and to choose the option of criminal behaviour. A more egalitarian and efficient system of justice is fundamental for preventing crime.

With regards to how easy it is to get access to weapons, as José Mariano Beltrame, the Secretary for Public Security for Rio de Janeiro has already said, we have to consider the history of the city that was the capital of the country between 1688 and 1960. For a long time, there have been several munitions dumps in the city containing a lot of guns and ammunition. Due to difficulties with internal control in these places, these arms and ammunition ended up in places where the informal nature of property and land ownership has still not been resolved. This is why these neighbourhoods are known as "sub-normal" or "favelas". In Rio's favelas, a lot of problems related to urban infrastructure – electricity, water and even basic

sanitation—have now been reduced, although they still have not been totally solved. The issue of ownership remains the same, as access – who can and cannot move into the favela – is increasingly dependent on the decisions or permissions granted by those who control the favela. These controllers are either well-armed traffickers, or militias, equally well-armed, but without the accumulation of weapons used for territorial wars with rival groups or the police, seeing as it is the police themselves that control them.

Civil and Military Police carry out armed incursions in the favelas and poor neighbourhoods, confronting the traffickers in violent clashes, but it is mainly corrupt police officers who take arms into the favelas for the traffickers and they are rarely investigated and punished. A great number of arms are available to young people residing in favelas that are considered to be dangerous because they are dominated by traffickers. The fact that these people carry firearms is explained by the logic of war: competitors in the drug business become each other's mortal enemies, a situation which is dissuaded through progressively increasing the gang's arsenal of weapons and men. This logic is, however, expanded and taken to its limit by small groups made up of young people, like bands or gangs. Young people start to arm themselves to avoid being victimised by their peers, who also carry weapons. They do this to command respect and to enjoy the prestige involved with carrying a gun. The ease with which young people can acquire guns in the trafficker-dominated favelas means that the value attributed to a man increases when he has a gun. This is how they win "consideration" or "reputation". The owners of the guns, which come from ammunition

dumps, lend them to other young people so that they can assault or kill when faced with invasions or acts of vengeance. To use a gun, they have to acquire what they call a "killing disposition". In other words, they need to turn into a harder, crueller person who is insensitive to the suffering of another person. The contamination of ideals, attitudes of cruelty and insensitivity to the suffering of other people are spread amongst them. This has become natural to them, as if there is no other way to behave. Peer group pressure is the biggest cause of crimes committed by young people, mainly murders committed with firearms.

This is what one American author called the ecology of danger, showing that, in American cities that he surveyed where people carry guns, the possibility of a young person also getting hold of a gun is 19 times greater than in areas where people do not carry guns. Therefore, the control of access to guns and their commercialisation is an indispensable part of any policy aimed at preventing violence.

The other issue involves the creation of a masculine identity amongst young men, who must choose between several models. There are many styles of masculinity: migrants from other states, second generation Rio-born migrants, young black men from different racial backgrounds, young men that hang around the city's alleys, streets and plazas or those that participate in sport and cultural projects, young men who leave school and are left with no prospects for the future and those who are disciplined at school and adopt values of triumphing through merit, dedication and hard work. These different styles exist simultaneously in any neighbourhood, but the latter style can be


squashed in districts where the style of the trafficker, hyper-masculinity, predominates.

With hyper-masculinity, conspicuous consumption defines new successful masculine identities and the new images of a successful man. Helping friends, neighbours and family members by lending money, impressing everyone with a show of conspicuous consumption by decking themselves out with jewellery and brand-name clothes, spending a lot of money on parties and barbeques, paying for drinks in bars and buying brand new cars all help a young person to establish themselves, to gain respect and appreciation from neighbours and colleagues. Aside from this, but part of the same pattern, there is also a show of insensitivity, of cruelty, that also increases the amount of respect (or fear) that they inspire in others. This is the style that has been defined as exaggerated masculinity or spectacular exhibition of masculine protest. The young men who adopt this style turn into a threat to the neighbourhood and are stigmatised by the State as criminals who should be repressed or imprisoned. This style has also been very well studied in the United States, because it is also a problem there that will be confronted by projects for the prevention of violence that are already under way. In Brazil, much more attention should be paid to what is happening with young people who are increasingly attracted to violent practices where conflicts are resolved through physical force or firearms. These instruments of violence are used to impose their will on others in order to obtain money by assault, robbery or extortion to purchase material goods that will impress their peers.

The data curve for murders in Brazil, described above, comes as no surprise.

There is no doubt that this issue mainly involves younger people. The curve starts to rise at 13 years old, and only goes down after 40 or 35 years old. The following graph was taken from the map of violence, which is a UNESCO study of Brazilian youth.


Graph 1



Source: *Map of Violence IV: Young people of Brazil, UNESCO*

The second graph, taken from the same study, shows that the figures for older people remained stable between 1980 and 2002 (when the study ended), whereas the figures for young people increased by around 100%.

Graph 2




Source: *Map of Violence IV: Young people of Brazil, UNESCO*

As well as this, work has been carried out by the Centre for Research into Violence (NUPEVI) at the Social Medicine Institute of the Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ), which makes a comparison between the four capitals of the southeast, the region with the highest murder rates in the country. Between 1994 and 2004, the tendencies in these capitals were very different and can only be explained by

looking at the social context. These tendencies are still present today, although the murder rates have diminished at different rates in three of the four capitals: the decrease was extraordinary in São Paulo, whereas Vitória and Rio de Janeiro showed much smaller decreases and there has been a notable increase in the rate in Belo Horizonte. This graph shows just how complex the explanation for violence is, requiring a lot of factors to be considered. Neither the disarmament that happened in 2004, nor poverty or inequality can explain everything. Even if they did provide sufficient explanation, we would not be able to understand the oscillations seen in graph 3, or why there are several times more male than female victims, and why there are also several times more young than old victims. Poverty is something that affects people of different ages and sexes in a much more uniform way.

Graph 3



Source: *DATASUS, Ministry of Health, Federal Government*

Different rates are found depending on race and colour, when murder rates are analysed for men between 15 and 39 years old. This is the age range into which around 80% of violent deaths in Rio de Janeiro fall, which also includes people who died as a result of confrontation with the police (known as resistance deaths), and not just deaths that are officially classified as murder. The rate for black and mixed race<sup>1</sup> people is almost

<sup>1</sup> White, black and Amerindian

three times higher than that of whites (*graph 4*). Why? One possible interpretation is that black and mixed race people are more vulnerable to being attracted by gangs, where they enter into warfare against other gangs and against the police to kill or be killed. Young men are vulnerable in poor areas with irregular housing, where police repression is much more violent with an excessive use of force. There is also the factor, as I have already mentioned, of access to firearms that are brought in by "mules" or corrupt police officers.

Graph 4



Source: DATASUS, Ministry of Health, Federal Government

This does not mean that there is similar spatial segregation in the ghettos in Brazil to that which exists in the United States of America. It has to be taken into account for the victimisation and IBGE surveys, carried out in the city and favelas of Rio de Janeiro, that colour and race are both self-designated in Brazil. In other words, each person states what colour and race they are. This means that there is not much similarity between what is considered as white in Brazil and what is considered as white in the United States, because our classification is carried out by type and not by officially recorded genealogy. Someone who is the son of a black person, but with a lighter skin tone, and other characteristics, could be considered as white. Having said this, there is a more accentuated and, above all, a more recognised grading of colours that everyone

in Brazil knows about. In summary, racism in the United States is clearly dichotomous (whites and blacks), whereas racism in Brazil is hierarchical - the graduations in colour are important for the social production of hierarchy, considering factors considered as more beautiful, superior and of better quality. In the favelas in Rio de Janeiro, 45% of people classify themselves as white, and 20% as black, which is different to the city as a whole, where 9% of the population classify themselves as black, 34% as being from other racial backgrounds and 56% as white. In other words, the favela cannot be considered as a racial ghetto. Similarly it cannot be said that it is excluded without elaborating on how it is excluded.

The following graphs (5, 6 and 7) were drawn up from data from house-to-house victimisation surveys that were carried out by NUPEVI in the city of Rio de Janeiro in 2006, and in this city's favelas in 2007. Both the surveys were carried out by random sampling in three stages. I choose the variable that perhaps best represents the atrocious suffering that Rio de Janeiro's population has to put up with due to the situation that has been established in the city: the loss of family members, friends and neighbours due to murders. The proportion of people surveyed who had lost friends, family and neighbours during the previous 12 months was around 5% of the population. Many people have suffered a great deal psychologically because of these deaths. The distribution is also revealing, as it shows exactly how age, income, location and neighbourhood - designated as a city Planning Area<sup>2</sup> - affect the proportions. The percentage of people who have neighbours who have been murdered is related to the

<sup>2</sup> Name given to parts of Rio de Janeiro. There are five planning areas in total, AP1 - AP5.

zone they live in; the percentage of people with friends who have been killed is related to age, as it is mainly young people who lose friends; and the percentage of people with family members who have been killed is related to family income.

Graph 5



Source: NUPEVI Victimization Survey 2005-2006, district of Rio de Janeiro

Graph 6



Source: NUPEVI Victimization Survey 2005-2006, district of Rio de Janeiro

Graph 7



Source: NUPEVI Victimization Survey 2005-2006, district of Rio de Janeiro

More impressive still are the differences between the favelas and the street, or housing that is classified as sub-normal by the IBGE that is registered as a "favela" by the IBGE and by the Local Government of the City of Rio de Janeiro to differentiate them from the "normal" or regular city when it comes to land ownership and the

payment of urban land taxes. In the favelas, people have reported almost double the number of murdered neighbours when compared to the regular city. The broken window theory can hardly be used to explain all this; it is inconsequential in the favela.

Graph 8



Source: NUPEVI Victimization Survey 2005-2006, district of Rio de Janeiro

Graph 9



Source: NUPEVI Victimization Survey 2005-2006, district of Rio de Janeiro

Other graphs and tables show that the main signs of crime inside the favelas are people selling drugs, using drugs and armed people fighting. This makes it clear that violence goes hand-in-hand with drug trafficking inside the favelas, but it also spreads through the city.

Still more impressive is the difference between policing approaches and tactics in the regular city when compared to the favela. According to people who live in the favelas, the perception of the excessive use of force, in the form of unprovoked shooting, is clearly greater in the favelas than in the rest of the city, but is not uniform


across the whole city. This is more evident in the Planning Areas where the favelas are dominated by traffickers than those where the militias dominate the favelas, like AP4.

Table 1

	Cidade 2006	Favelas 2007
Pessoas agredindo fisicamente outras pessoas	18,8%	37%
Pessoas consumindo drogas ilegais na rua	27,1%	45%
Pessoas vendendo drogas ilegais na rua	13,0%	28%
Pessoas armadas brigando	11,8%	15%
Já via Pessoas sendo assaltadas nas ruas da vizinhança	18,1%	4,3%
Já via Pessoas da vizinhança levadas à força	2,0%	8,8%
Já via Pessoas sendo mortas por armas de fogo	5,3%	14,8%
Já via Policiais estirpando ou intimidando	6,6%	17,6%
Já via Policiais atirando sem provocação em pessoas	2,5%	13,8%
Assassinaram parentes	5,2%	5%
Assassinaram amigos	5,8%	8,9%
Assassinaram vizinhos	4,2%	6,1%


Source: NUPEVI Victimisation Survey 2005-2006, district of Rio de Janeiro  
 NUPEVI Victimisation Survey 2007, favelas in the district of Rio de Janeiro

Graph 10



Source: NUPEVI Victimisation Survey 2005-2006, district of Rio de Janeiro

Graph 11



Source: NUPEVI Victimisation Survey 2005-2006, district of Rio de Janeiro


Another significant difference in the city is found in the type of private security that exists in various neighbourhoods. According to the 2006 victimisation survey data, 25% of people who live in the city have some type of private security. In the favelas, as has already been discussed at

length, the militias are a form of security. The traffickers can also sometimes count as "security" offered against attackers and other predators, but sometimes cannot. It should not, therefore, be forgotten that security arrangements are very varied: third party security without a regular job, uniform or Federal Police training, uniformed employees from a security company, non-uniformed employees, paid or unpaid traffickers, residents who act as neighbourhood protectors without charging anything, residents who charge money, informal security personnel who are residents and guards that are commonly referred to as "militia" by the Brazilian media.

According to data from the survey carried out in 2007 only in the favelas, 71% of them are dominated by traffickers and 28.9% by militias. When experiences of violence are compared - such as gunshot noise, armed people fighting, murdered neighbours and friends – it is always the favelas dominated by traffickers that show much higher proportions. 47% of people over 15 years old hear gunshot noise, 7.9% of them frequently, whereas in the areas dominated by militias only 7.5% hear gunshots all the time, and 2.7% hear them frequently. The militia, therefore, is able to reduce armed violence, but this does not mean that it really protects the population or that it does not turn into a predatory organisation. It is not able to reduce, for example, another type of violence – that of physical aggression: the percentage of men and women that are attacked during their lifetime is greater in militia-controlled favelas. This is because the militias use a lot of physical aggression to control the area, to punish drug users or whoever refuses to obey their orders and demands. It cannot be

concluded that the militia solves the security problem for the population of the favelas, as they are against a democratic State and are in favour of charging over the odds for goods and services that are sold by the armed men that make up the militia.

Graph 12



Source: NUPEVI Victimization Survey 2007, favelas in the district of Rio de Janeiro

Graph 13



Source: NUPEVI Victimization Survey 2007, favelas in the district of Rio de Janeiro

Finally, after reviewing this decisive data, a discussion can take place regarding what to do in terms of proactive measures that either prevent or anticipate crime. Firstly, it is necessary to consider how to halt the flow of arms and ammunition that end up in the hands of vulnerable young people in the poorest areas, where the perverse association between traffickers and corrupt police officers makes them so easily accessible. Restricting the flow of arms into the most dangerous and unsafe areas of the city means carrying out better investigations into the networks that supply drugs and guns. Policing should be orientated towards interrupting this flow, using what is called

"gun-orientated policing", a measure taken in a lot of American cities to prevent the entrance of guns and young people being trained in cruelty and violence.

Secondly, so that the obstacles to the entry of guns give longer-lasting results, it is necessary to try to socialise young people so as to reverse the attraction that they feel towards hardness, cruelty and the use of guns to confirm their male identity. In other words, disarm them internally from the means and attitude of death in their subjective formation. Young people learn from other gun-wielding young people how to be more cruel, aggressive, hard and barbaric through living with them and observing them in situ. They learn a killing disposition or how to be agents of death through these instrumental practices with guns. Unfortunately, some of these young people learn how to use guns due to the presence of other young people who receive training with the Brazilian Armed Forces during their obligatory military service. Some of these become gang members to carry out the role of armourer, whereas others are forced by the traffickers to give this training.

Thirdly, other preventative methods are related to education in civility. In other words, it is important to explain how to be a proud man through showing respect for others instead of having a disposition to kill or hurt others. Instead of being aggressive with others, young people need to know how to control their emotions, demonstrate that they are civilised, and know how to negotiate through dialogue, as is done in sport. This means removing the desire to kill from their hearts and minds. Measures like these can be implemented through neighbourhood, collective and cross-

generational cultural and sports programmes. If different aged neighbours are involved, mainly the oldest ones, continuity is given to the informal socialisation process in the neighbourhood, forming a base for the construction of social ties of trust and mutual aid. It is fundamental to bring the oldest people from these neighbourhoods together, as they are bastions of other values, identities and conquests that they have not had the opportunity to pass on to the young people who get together and close themselves into different types of bands and gangs.

Finally, but no less important, socialisation in civility must be carried out everywhere: in the media, schools, courts, health centres and hospitals. The child and youth court is taking measures in this direction together with young people and those responsible for them, but ways of dealing with what is happening all over Brazil must also be considered. Programmes such as these must be an integrated strategy so that they do not break up into a lot of small and intermittent interventions. School and other further study courses must also be integrated and be of sufficient quality to create real employment and independent work alternatives that guarantee an income that is compatible with human dignity. Without this, it is impossible to construct the pride of being civilised. However, respecting other is an imperative, being open to dialogue is important to success at school and, later, in any paid employment.